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Abstract  
Public Procurement Law is the acquisition of goods, works and services by a 
contracting authority through the use of a public contract.  The general principles 
of Public Procurement Law dictate that suppliers are treated fairly and without 
discrimination whilst encouraging transparency, proportionality, competition and 
free trade within the member states. This area of law is mainly regulated by the 
EU through the use of Directives and their national equivalent, judge-made law 
from the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’) and national courts.   
 Due to the substantial amount involved throughout the life cycle of the public 
contract (including the contract value), it is paramount that the contract is 
awarded to the right supplier in order to attain value for money. As such, 
unqualified suppliers should be eliminated from the procurement exercise. Art.57 
(4) (c) of Directive 2014/24/EU and reg. 57 (8) (c) of the UK Public Contracts 
Regulation 2015 (PCR 2015) specifies that a contracting authority may exclude an 
economic operator who by conviction by a final judgement is guilty of “grave 
professional misconduct”. With no definition of this phrase offered by Directive 
2014/24/EU, PCR 2015 and their predecessors, this paper seeks to examine the 
judicial interpretation of the concept of “grave professional misconduct” through 
an analysis of key judgements from the Court of Justice of the European Union 
and national courts. The paper will conclude by identifying important lessons for 
contracting authorities and current or prospective suppliers when an issue of grave 
professional misconduct arises.   
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1. Introduction  
The definition of public procurement used to be complex and dependent on each 
country’s definition of the relationship between government agencies and the 
private sector.  However, with the internationalisation of public procurement 
through international agreements such as the WTO GPA2, the UNCITRAL model 
law3 and the regulation of public procurement across the 28  EU member states, 
the concept of public procurement has become clear with its regulations 
modernised to accommodate technological advancements and other provisions 
that enhance the integration of member states both within the EU and the larger 
global market.4  While it is acknowledged that public procurement is a global tool 
that affects all 196 countries in our global village with regulations amongst the 
countries diverse, this paper is concerned with the regulation of public 
procurement in the EU, especially by the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(‘CJEU’) and in national courts of the EU member states.  
In its simplest form, EU public procurement is defined as the acquisition by means 
of a public contract of works, goods or services by one or more contracting 
authority from suppliers chosen by the contracting authorities.5 Public 
procurement is a highly regulated area in the EU as it accounts for 14% of each 
member state’s national GDP.6  According to the European Commission, over 
250,000 contracting authorities (public authorities) procure goods, works and 
services annually.7 It is probably not an exaggeration to consider the 
consequences of not regulating public procurement both on national level and in 
a supranational institution like the EU as catastrophic.  As a result, since 1971, 
the EU has regulated public procurement through the adoption of Directives which 
give member states a transposition period of usually 24 months.8 Interwoven with 
                                                          
2 World Trade Organisation Government Procurement Agreement 2012 
3 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on Public 
Procurement 2011. The Model Law is supplemented with a Guide to Enactment of 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of Goods, Construction and Services 2012.  
4 The UK voted on the 23rd June to leave the European Union. While it is clear that Article 
50 has been triggered by Prime Minister Theresa May, there is no immediate amendment 
of the Public Contracts Regulations and many academics do not foresee any changes to 
the Regulations in the near future. As such, the UK is still considered a member state until 
the two years in article 50 have lapsed.   
5 Directive 2014/24/EU OJ L 94, art 1(2) 
6 European Commission, ‘Public Procurement’ (Europa.EU) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/public-procurement_en> accessed 20 June 
2017 
7 Ibid  
8 The history of EU public procurement law has been relatively clear cut.  The first EU 
Directive dealing with public procurement was Directive 71/305/EEC OJ L 185 which 
regulated the procurement of works and Directive 77/62/EEC for supplies.  These 
directives were shortly amended following the enactment of Directive 89/440/EEC OJ L 
210 for works and Directive 88/295/EEC OJ L 127 for supplies.  With further amendments 
carried out in 1993 and 2004, the most recent legislative regulation of public procurement 
in the EU is in form of Directive 2014/24/EU for public works, services and goods; Directive 
2014/23/EU OJ L 94 for Concessions and Directive 2014/25/EU OJ L 94 for the regulation 
of Utilities.  To ensure compliance and effectiveness of the rules, Directive 92/13/EC OJ L 
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the legislative regulation of public procurement in the EU is the regulation of 
procurement through case law “oriented towards ensuring the effectiveness” of 
the rules.9 The CJEU has been instrumental in the modernisation of the legislative 
regulation of public procurement, especially with the notion of grave professional 
misconducts as will be shown later in this paper. The author will not set out the 
basic rules and principles governing public procurement in the EU.  
 
There are different directives governing public procurement in the EU. As footnote 
8 states, Directive 2014/24/EU oversees the procurement of goods, works and 
services; The regulation of utilities is governed by Directive 2014/25/EU, 
concessions being Directive 2014/23/EU10 and defence procurement being 
Directive 2009/81/EC. While it is acknowledged that the exclusion of suppliers is 
applicable to all the Directives, from the procurement of goods, works and services 
to the procurement of utilities and military weapons, this paper seeks to address 
the exclusion of suppliers from the provision of Directive 2014/24/EU, and its 
direct predecessor Directive 2004/18/EC and the Public Contracts Regulation 2015 
(‘PCR’) which governs the procurement of goods, works and services in the United 
Kingdom (‘UK’).  Due to the similarities in Directive 2014/24/EU and the PCR, the 
majority of this paper will address the concept of “grave professional misconduct” 
from judicial and statutory provisions in the EU and from the perspective of 
selected EU member states such as Poland, Netherlands and Italy. The UK’s 
position will not be addressed in this paper as there is currently no caselaw in the 
courts of England and Wales addressing this issue.  
 
To provide clarity and ease for the reader, any reference to suppliers in this paper 
will have the same meaning as economic operators and tenderers although some 
academics may find these terms to be different. To begin, the author will analyse 
the general principles of public procurement, provide a basic overview of how this 
ground of exclusion fits into the procurement process and how relevant the 
procurement principles are in the exclusion of suppliers.  
 
 
2. Principles of Procurement  
The importance of public procurement and its role in maintaining integration 
across the member states in the EU cannot be overstated.11  The economic 
regulation of public procurement in the EU is essential to the strengthening of the 
                                                          
76, Directive 89/665/EEC OJ L 395 and the modernised Directive 2007/66/EC OJ L 335 
provide remedies for breaches of the procurement rules.  
9 Dr Albert Sanchez-Graells, “‘If it ain't broke, don't fix it’? EU requirements of 
administrative oversight and judicial protection for public contracts” To be published in S 
Torricelli & F Folliot Lalliot (eds), Administrative oversight and judicial protection for public 
contracts (Larcier, 2017).  
10  The regulation of concessions used to be governed by the public-sector directives – 
being Directive 2004/18/EC OJ L 134 and its predecessors. However, the 2014 enactment 
changed this by creating a separate directive that regulates concessions.  
11 Albert Sanchez Graellz, Public procurement and  the EU competition rules ( Hart 
Publishing 2011), pg. 3 
4 
 
single market as public procurement has been identified as a “non-tariff barrier” 
which guarantees an open market economy with free competition according to 
article 119 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).12  
Underpinning this regulation of procurement are the principles of non-
discrimination, equal treatment of all suppliers, proportionality and transparency.  
While these principles appear in the textual provisions of the TFEU – article 18 for 
non-discrimination and the procurement directives, specifically article 18 of 
Directive 2014/24/EU, the understanding of these principles has been developed 
by the CJEU.  Complying with these principles applies to all public procurement 
carried out by a contracting authority in the EU regardless of the contract value. 
As such, this is the minimal expectation that must be applied to all aspects of the 
procurement process from the drafting of the technical specification, choice of 
procedures, the qualification of tenderers including the exclusion of suppliers on 
the grounds of grave professional misconduct and the award of the contract to the 
successful supplier.  
 
2.1 Non-discrimination  
The key principle underlining the strengthening of competition in EU public 
procurement is the principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality. 
As previously mentioned, this principle predates the regulation of EU public 
procurement as this was expressly prohibited under article 18 TFEU and by the 
CJEU through cases such as Beentjes13. Over the years, contracting authorities 
have developed innovative way of discriminating suppliers on the grounds of 
nationality.  For example, requiring the supply of pipes to meet Irish standards as 
was done in Commission v Ireland14. In order to ensure the judicial creation of law 
is running concurrently with statutory provisions and modern developments, the 
CJEU also developed innovative ways of analysing the intentions of the authorities 
and thus have prohibited any discriminatory measures found in the procurement 
process.   
 
2.2 Equal treatment  
Prior to the 2004 directives, the language of the procurement legislation did not 
expressly include the principle of equal treatment as a legal obligation for the 
contracting authorities. As such, the CJEU in the case of Commission v Denmark15 
emphasised that this principle “lies at the very heart of the directive”.16 The 
principle of equal treatment was defined in the case of Fabricom SA17 which 
explained that this principle requires that “comparable situations must not be 
treated differently and that different situations must not be treated in the same 
way unless such treatment is objectively justified”.18  Moreover, the CJEU has 
                                                          
12 François Lichère, Roberto Caranta and Steen Treumer (eds), Modernising Public 
Procurement: The New Directive (DJØF Publishing. 2014). See also Sanchez Graells (n 11)  
at pg.3 
13 Case 31/87 Gebroeders Beentjes v The Netherlands  (“Beentjes”) [1988] E.C.R. 4653 
14 Case 45/87 Commission v Ireland [1988] ECR 4929 
15 Case C-243/89 Commission v Denmark ("Storebaelt") [1993] ECR I-3353 
16 Ibid  
17 Joined cases C-21/03 and C-34/03 Fabricom SA v État Belge [2005] ECR I-01559 
18 Ibid, para.27  
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stressed that the principle of equal treatment does not only apply to those 
suppliers that have participated in the procurement process but also to those that 
hope to participate.19  As such, actions such as giving more information to 
domestic/national suppliers than foreign suppliers or excluding a supplier on the 
grounds of grave professional misconduct and not excluding another supplier of 
the same or similar circumstance would be a breach of equal treatment.  
 
2.3 Transparency  
A third principle is that of transparency which requires contracting authorities to 
conduct procurement in an open, clear and impartial manner. According to 
Arrowsmith, Linarelli and Wallace, this principle can be broken down into four 
different components, that is: 
(i) The publicity of contract opportunities; 
(ii)  The publicity for the rules governing each procedure; 
(iii)  The limits on discretion; and 
(iv) The provision for verification that the rules have been followed and 
for enforcement where they have not.20   
As regards judicial interpretation of the principle of transparency, the CJEU has 
been actively instrumental in the widening and modernisation of the principle to 
cover cases that would otherwise fall short through legislative enactments.  
Ironically, the CJEU has ruled against many EU institutions that fail to comply with 
procurement principles listed above or the procurement rules especially when the 
said institution drafted or implemented the law.  For example, in the case of 
Embassy Limousine v European Parliament21, the EP sought to procure a chauffeur 
driven car services for the Members of Parliament (MEP).  The relevant committee 
recommended that Embassy Limousine be awarded the contract and this was 
communicated to Embassy who relied on this and started preparing for the 
execution of the contract. A few months later, doubts were raised about the 
integrity of Embassy and this led to the award of the contract to another supplier. 
In issuing proceedings, Embassy argued that the EP breached the principle of 
transparency as it had failed to keep them informed about the subsequent doubt. 
The CJEU ruled in Embassy’s favour.  Transparency in procurement procedures 
both in the EU and outside is therefore important to ensure contracting authorities 
are in compliance with the prescribed rules.  
 
2.4 Proportionality  
Finally, the principle of proportionality requires that any measures chosen by the 
contracting authority be both necessary and proportionate in light of the objectives 
sought.22  As will be seen in the analysis of judicial interpretation of the notion of 
                                                          
19 Case C-16/98 Commission v France [2000] ECR I-8315 
20 Sue Arrowsmith, Paula Faustino, Baudouin Heunincks, Steen Treumer and Jens Fejø, EU 
Public Procurement Law: An Introduction (2010). Retrieved from 
<https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/pprg/documentsarchive/asialinkmaterials/eupublicprocu
rementlawintroduction.pdf>  accessed 15 June 2017 
21 Case T-203/96 Embassy Limousine and Services v European Parliament [1998] ECRII-
4239 
22 Arrowsmith (n 20) 
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professional grave misconduct, the success of each case usually hinges on the 
issue of proportionality, that is, whether it was necessary to exclude a supplier on 
the grounds of grave professional misconduct.   
 
In addition to the general principles of public procurement, the EU has a number 
of objectives. The most common objective is the promotion of competition across 
the member states which will generate better value for money and the reduction 
of corruption or poor procurement practices.23  Competition in public procurement 
simply means that contracts are awarded as a result of opening the bid process 
to many suppliers before choosing the most economically advantageous tender.24 
While it is clear that the EU aims to foster competition through the use of public 
procurement, this objective can conflict with national procurement objectives.  The 
UK announced in its consultation exercise for the 2014 directive that it aimed to 
adopt policies that will increase the participation of SMEs, encourage 
environmental and sustainable procurement, address human rights issues such as 
the prohibition of trafficking in supply chains in UK public procurement.25  The UK’s 
objectives and the EU objective may come into conflict when, for example, the UK 
tries to award its contracts to local SMEs in order to encourage more SMEs to 
compete for contracts.  While this objective may be easily achieved for contracts 
under the EU threshold as these contracts are not subject to the Directives but 
only to the procurement principles, it will certainly breach the principle of non-
discrimination.  
 
3.  The exclusion of suppliers  
In EU public procurement exercises where two or more suppliers have responded 
to a call for competition by either submitting their tenders through the use of the 
open procedure or sent a request for participation, the contracting authority will 
need to eliminate some suppliers in order to award the contract to the successful 
supplier.26  This process is known as the qualification of tenderers which can be 
done under two legal provisions, namely article 57 and article 58 of Directive 
2014/24/EU.  This paper is concerned with article 57, the exclusion of suppliers. 
 The exclusion grounds aim to exclude suppliers from participating in the 
procurement process when the contracting authority can establish from a final 
court ruling that the supplier(s) has been convicted of crimes and conduct listed 
                                                          
23 Sanchez-Graells  (n 11)  
24 Sue Arrowsmith and Arwel Davies, Public Procurement: Global Revolution (Kluwer Law 
International Ltd 1998) pg.15 
25 Crown Commercial Service, A Brief Guide to the 2014 EU Public Procurement 
Directives ( CCS, October 2010) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/56026
1/Brief_Guide_to_the_2014_Directives_Oct_16.pdf> accessed 29/06/2017 
26 Article 26 of Directive 2014/24/EU deals with the choice of procedures. There are 
currently six procedures available to member states. As a minimum requirement, member 
states must provide either the open or restricted procedure and may use any of the 
negotiated procedures (competitive procedure with negotiation, competitive dialogue, 
innovation partnership and negotiated procedure without prior publication) if the 
conditions in art 26(4) have been established.  
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in article 57.  From the language of the provision, there are mandatory and 
discretionary grounds for exclusion.  
Just like the name suggests, under the mandatory exclusion, the contracting 
authority ‘shall’ exclude suppliers who are guilty of the crimes listed. This means 
that if it is established that the tenderer has committed offences such as fraud, 
corruption, trafficking of human beings, terrorist offences etc they must be 
excluded without any discretion from the contracting authority.27 In addition to 
the mandatory exclusion, contracting authority ‘may’ exclude a tenderer from the 
procurement process when their misconduct falls under art 57 (4) which includes 
bankruptcy, conflict of interests, distortion of competition and where the tenderer 
is guilty of grave professional misconduct.28  
As has been mentioned in passing, member states have a transposition period to 
implement an EU Directive.  Due to the nature of directives, member states are 
permitted to alter the provisions in the directive when implementing the national 
equivalent if the spirit of the directive and the minimum requirements are 
complied with. The EU public procurement directives are not an exception to this 
rule. Regarding the discretionary grounds of exclusion, the contracting authority 
has a discretion on whether to exclude or not and if it decides to exclude, it must 
do so regardless of the stage of the procurement procedure and, in compliance 
with the procurement principles mentioned above. In addition, member states also 
have the discretion to upgrade an EU discretionary ground to the member state's 
mandatory ground for exclusion. This right has been exercised by member states 
such as Poland and Italy.   
 
There are derogations provided in the Directive for the exclusion of suppliers. 
Article 57 (3) provides for derogations when it is in the public interest, public 
health or protection of the environment. In addition to this derogation, the 
procurement directive also provides for self-cleaning. The self-cleaning measure 
is a tool used by suppliers excluded under article 57 to redeem their misconduct 
and be eligible to participate in a future call for competition. This measure was 
introduced under article 45(2) of Directive 2004/18/EU and is arguably in 
compliance with the EU principle of proportionality as it allows a supplier to regain 
and redeem its status either by ‘paying compensations’ or by ‘actively 
collaborating with the investigations’ after a limited time. Therefore, the exclusion 
grounds as briefly examined are not permanent exclusions from a procurement 
process but rather temporary in nature. This measure, should therefore be 
appreciated as a step towards harmonisation and rehabilitation in public 
procurement.   
 
 
4. What is grave professional misconduct? 
As previously mentioned, the exclusion of suppliers on the ground of grave 
professional misconduct was introduced under art.45 (2) (d) of Directive 
2004/18/EC which states that a supplier may be excluded if the supplier “has been 
guilty of grave professional misconduct proven by any means which the 
                                                          
27 Directive (n 8) 
28 Directive 2014/24/EU 
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contracting authorities can demonstrate”. Like many important concepts included 
in the procurement directives, no definition was offered and as such concepts like 
this are left to the court to adjudicate through the interpretation of the relevant 
EU law.  Eight years after the adoption of the directive, the CJEU offered a 
definition in the case of Forposta SA29.  
 In this case, the contracting authority and defendant (Poczta Polska) conducted 
an open procedure for the award of a public contract for the delivery of postal 
services. The value of the contract was above the relevant EU threshold under the 
2004 directive and so, the directive and its provisions, specifically art 45 (2) (d) 
was applied.  As a result of the value of the contract and the need for the contract 
to be performed effectively, the contract was divided into lots and was awarded 
to Forposata SA and ABC Direct Contract.  On the day the contract was meant to 
be awarded, the defendant cancelled the procedure on the grounds that the 
winning suppliers were subject to a mandatory exclusion under art art.24(1)(1a) 
of the Polish public procurement law 2004.  This Article states that any   
economic operators with which the contracting authority concerned 
annulled, terminated, or renounced a public contract owing to 
circumstances for which the economic operator is responsible, where 
the annulment, termination or renouncement occurred in the three-year 
period before the procedure was initiated and the value of the non-
performed part of the contract amounted to at least 5% of the contract’s 
value… must be excluded from the contract award procedure.  
This was therefore a compulsory mandatory exclusion under domestic Polish 
procurement law.  Forposta and ABC appealed against the decision of the 
contracting authority (Poczta Polska) to cancel the tendering procedure to 
the Krajowa Izba Odwoławcza (the Polish Public Procurement Office), 
claiming that the national provision was “much broader than the condition 
laid down in “ art.45(2)(d) of Directive 2004/18/EU.30  In considering the 
case, the Polish Procurement Office analysed the legal concept of grave 
professional misconduct which in their opinion relates to “ethics, dignity and 
professional conscientiousness” which would give rise to a professional 
liability if breached.31 The Polish Procurement Office further noted that the 
contracting authority was not equipped to decide or define what constitutes 
grave professional misconduct as this was a concept only the relevant 
professional body can ascertain.  
In dealing with the argument raised by Forposta that the polish law was broad in 
comparison to the provision in the directive, the Polish Procurement Office 
considered the language of article 45 which looked at the conduct which was 
“committed by the operator” that is, actions which are directly linked to the 
supplier and not actions which “that operator is responsible for” as stated in the 
                                                          
29 C-465/11 Forposta SA and ABC Direct Contact sp. z o.o. v Poczta Polska SA 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:801 
30 Ibid, para.9.  The issue of whether the Polish Public Procurement Office was a court or 
tribunal as defined in Article 267 TFEU was raised by the defendant on the grounds that 
the office had both judicial and advisory roles. The CJEU ruled that the office had the 
jurisdiction to make a preliminary reference and the fact it had both roles did not diminish 
its status as a court or tribunal. See para 17 and 18 of the case.  
31 Forposta, (n 29) para.11 
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Polish Law.32 Due to the lack of definition and guidance in the directive, the Polish 
Procurement Office sent a preliminary reference consisting of two questions to the 
CJEU.  The first question asked if grave professional misconduct includes the 
annulment or termination of a contract in the past three years by a contracting 
authority owing to circumstances for which that supplier is responsible.33 This 
question was essentially asking the court to define what grave professional 
misconduct is.   If the first question was negative, the Polish Procurement Office 
asked if the principles and rules of the procurement directives allowed a 
contracting authority to automatically exclude “on the grounds of protection of 
public interest, the legitimate interests of the contracting authorities or the 
maintenance of fair competition”.34  
This preliminary reference was inadmissible on the grounds that the Polish Public 
Procurement Office did not seek an interpretation of EU law but rather it sought 
to determine whether the national law was compatible or incompatible with art 45 
of Directive 2004/18/EU. This issue was highlighted as the role of the CJEU is not 
to determine the compatibility or legitimacy of national law but rather to interpret 
EU law. Despite this issue of inadmissibility, the CJEU was able to issue some 
guidance or direction on the concept of grave professional misconduct.35  In order 
to understand what is meant by ‘grave professional misconduct’, the concept was 
split into two, professional misconduct and grave misconduct.   For a supplier to 
be excluded under the grounds of grave professional misconduct, there must be 
a professional misconduct which is applied to the subject matter of the contract in 
order to determine whether the misconduct is grave to give rise to the exclusion.  
This therefore means that there is a two part test to be applied in order to 
determine the definition of grave professional misconduct.  
 
The first part looks at the definition of professional misconduct. It was pointed out 
that the concept of ‘professional misconduct’ covered “all wrongful conduct which 
has an impact on the professional credibility of the operator at issue and not only 
the violations of ethical standards…of the profession to which the operator 
belongs”.36  Professional misconduct may also include a situation where a supplier 
has failed to comply with any contractual obligations.37 In theory, it means for 
example, if a UK law firm was competing for a service contract to provide legal 
services to a contracting authority and that firm has breached and been  found 
guilty of any of the professional conduct issues set out in the SRA Code of Conduct, 
that firm has committed a professional misconduct.38 Please note that the SRA 
example does not amount to a grave professional misconduct but seeks to provide 
an example of a professional misconduct.   
 
                                                          
32 Ibid, para 12 
33 Ibid, para 15 
34 Ibid, para 15:  Susie Smith, ‘EU: Forposta SA, ABC Direct Contact sp. z o.o. v Poczta 
Polska SA (C-465/11) - exclusion on the grounds of grave professional misconduct’ [2013] 
PPLR 3, NA57-NA60 
35 Forposta (n 29), para.19 
36 Ibid, para.27 
37 Smith (n 34), pg.4 
38 Solicitors Regulations Authority Code of Conduct 2011 
10 
 
The second part of the test looked at the definition of ‘grave misconduct’. This 
concept refers to the conduct of the supplier “which denotes a wrongful intent or 
negligence of a certain gravity on its part”.39 The CJEU stressed that a mere breach 
of professional conduct does not necessarily amount to a grave misconduct.  This 
concept of ‘grave misconduct’ will have to be determined by the contracting 
authority in line with the subject matter of the contract. In the example given 
above relating to the SRA code of conduct, if the firm has consistently breached 
the principle of confidentiality as outlined in Outcome (4.1) of the SRA Code of 
Conduct, this can arguably be a grave professional misconduct as the subject 
matter of the contract would obviously require the successful supplier (firm) to 
keep the matters of the contracting authority confidential – maintaining the 
integrity of the firm. It must of course be stressed that what is determined as 
‘grave’ should be assessed on a case by case basis. The issue of proportionality, 
transparency and equal treatment in the assessment of this ground of exclusion 
will be examined below.   
Lesson one – what is the national definition of “grave professional 
misconduct”?  
This brings us to the first observation of the paper.  The carrying out of due 
diligence by the contracting authority prior to the exclusion of suppliers is key in 
neutralising challenges to the procurement process.  The wording of article 57(4) 
(c) requires the contracting authority to ‘demonstrate by appropriate means that 
the economic operator is guilty of grave professional misconduct’.  The simplest 
way of doing this is to reach out to the relevant professional body which the 
supplier in question is or should be associated with. In the example given above, 
a simple email to the Solicitors Regulatory Authority will provide the contracting 
authority with the information it needs to determine whether there has been an 
issue of professional misconduct and most importantly if this professional 
misconduct is a grievous misconduct from the perspective of the professional 
body.  It is important to stress that the opinion of the relevant professional body 
should not be the only justification for excluding the supplier but rather, the 
contracting authority should apply the professional misconduct to the subject 
matter of the procurement. Communication with the relevant professional body 
acts as a starting point to the investigation of misconduct and will provide the 
contracting authorities with evidence in support of the exclusion when the supplier 
commences litigation against the contracting authority.  
From a supplier’s perspective, the author advocates that they should consult their 
professional body’s Code of Conduct regularly in order to be aware of what 
constitutes professional misconducts. Doing so does not eliminate the possibility 
of a supplier being guilty of professional misconduct but it does provide a 
conscious awareness of what constitutes professional misconduct.  
Lesson two - No additional grounds for exclusion relating to professional 
qualities.  
As mentioned in passing, the case of Forposta was crucial to the understanding of 
grave professional misconduct as a result of the two questions sent to the CJEU 
for a preliminary ruling. Whilst the first question has been addressed above, the 
second question asked if the member states can automatically exclude a supplier 
on the grounds of protecting the “public interest, the legitimate interests of the 
                                                          
39  Forposta (n 29) 
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contracting authorities or the maintenance of fair competition between economic 
operators”.40  The CJEU held that while the contracting authorities have the power 
to add additional grounds of exclusion – mandatory or discretionary grounds, the 
contracting authorities are precluded from adding to the list of criteria relating to 
professional qualities. This ruling followed previous rulings such as La Cascina41, 
Michaniki 42 and others.  
For contracting authorities, this means that they are prohibited from using any 
other grounds of exclusions relating to the professional qualities of the supplier 
other than those listed in article 57 (4). This is arguably somewhat of a good news 
for suppliers as they can rely on the fact that exclusions relating to professional 
qualities are limited to those listed in article 57 (4) for which grave professional 
misconduct is among the grounds.43  
 
Lesson three – Contracting authorities must consider the procurement 
principles when excluding suppliers on the grounds of grave professional 
misconduct.  
The procurement principles are pervasive in all aspects of the procurement 
process from the pre-tender phase to the award of the contract to the successful 
supplier.  This means that the same principles as mentioned above in section 2 of 
this paper are important when excluding suppliers on the grounds of grave 
professional misconduct.  This issue was recently addressed in the case of 
Connexxion Taxi Services44 and re-emphasised in Casertana Costruzioni Srl45.  
In Connexxion Taxi Services, the Dutch Ministry of Health (‘herein after referred 
to as the contracting authority’) launched a call for competition for the award of 
transport services for persons with reduced mobility.46 The contract was valued at 
EUR 60,000,000 which meant that Directive 2004/18/EC and the national 
equivalent Besluit aanbestedingsregels voor overheidsopdrachten (the ‘BAO’) was 
applicable to this procurement.47  The law of public procurement reproduced article 
45 of Directive 2004/18/EC in its entirety which includes the exclusion of a supplier 
on the grounds of grave professional misconduct.48  The decision on whether to 
use any of the discretionary grounds as a mandatory ground was left to the 
discretion of the contracting authorities. As such, in the descriptive document 
published in relation to this contract, the contracting authority under para.3.1 
                                                          
40 Ibid, para.37  
41 Joined Cases C‑226/04 and C‑228/04 La Cascina and Others [2006] ECR I‑1347, [22]. 
Case can be viewed by clicking on <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62004CJ0226> accessed 18 June 2017 
42 Case C‑213/07 Michaniki AE v Ethniko Symvoulio Radiotileorasis and Ypourgos 
Epikrateias [2008] ECR I‑9999, para. 43 
43 Directive 2014/24/EU 
44 C-171/15 Connexxion Taxi Services BV v Staat der Nederlanden EU:C:2016:948  
45 C-223/16 Casertana Costruzioni Srl v Ministero delle Infrastrutture e dei Trasporti — 
Provveditorato Interregionale per le opere pubbliche della Campania e del Molise 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:365 
46 Connexxion (n 44) 
47 The BAO translates to the Law of public procurement 2012 
48 Article 45 of Directive 2004/18/EC was applicable not article 57 of Directive 2014/24/EU 




clearly stated that “a tender to which a ground for exclusion applies shall be set 
aside and shall not be eligible for further (substantive) assessment” (the 
“automatic exclusion” of the supplier).49  
 
Connexxion and the ‘Tender group’ which comprised three companies 
(Transvision, RMC and ZCN) both took part in the call for tenders and were asked 
to complete a self-declaration form which declared that neither of the suppliers 
“nor any manager” were guilty of any grounds of exclusion found in article 45 of 
the law of public procurement, which includes the ground of grave professional 
misconduct.  By a letter dated 8 October 2012, the Ministry informed Connexxion 
that its tender had been placed second, with the contract awarded to the Tender 
group.   Before the contract was awarded, on 20 November 2012, the Dutch 
Competition Authority imposed a number of sanctions on RMC ZNC for breach of 
competition rules which took place in 2009 and 2011 relating to taxi services in 
the Rotterdam region.   On 18 February 2013, the Ministry wrote to Connexxion, 
informing them that it stood by its decision to award the contract to the Tender 
group despite the Group being guilty of grave professional misconduct.  As a result 
of the award, Connexxion brought legal proceedings, seeking an order to prohibit 
the Ministry from awarding the contract.  
The court hearing the application for interim measures (the ‘Voorzieningenrechter 
te Den Haag’) held in favour of Connexxion. It was of the opinion that once it was 
established that the Tender group was guilty of grave professional misconduct, it 
should have been excluded from the tender process as the inclusion of para 3.1 
in the descriptive document was a mandatory automatic exclusion.  This decision 
was appealed to the Court of Appeal (the Gerechtshof Den Haag) which set aside 
the decision of the court of first instance in this case, thereby granting the Ministry 
the authority to award the contract to the Tender group on the grounds that it 
would have been disproportionate to exclude the Tender group from the 
procurement process. The case was further appealed to the Supreme Court.  The 
Supreme Court had doubts as to whether the principle of the proportionality, equal 
treatment and transparency test were incorporated into the descriptive document 
and thus a legitimate tool to be used by the contracting authority in not excluding 
the Tender group.  The Supreme Court subsequently referred the following 
questions to the CJEU: 
1)     Is it consistent with Directive 2004/18 (article 45 (2)) for a Member State 
to require contracting authorities to make the possible exclusion of 
tenderers who have been guilty of grave professional misconduct subject to 
an assessment of proportionality? 
 
2) Is it significant in this regard that a contracting authority has stated in the 
tender conditions that a tender to which a ground for exclusion applies must 
be set aside and is not to be eligible for further substantive assessment? 
 
First question  
                                                          
49 Susie smith, ‘Optional ground for exclusion for grave professional misconduct and the 
requirements for proportionality, equal treatment and transparency: C-171/15 
Connexxion Taxi Services’ [2017] PPLR 3, NA86-NA90, pg. 3 
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In regard to the first question, the CJEU re-emphasised the application of the 
procurement principles throughout the procurement process. This means that the 
principles of proportionality, equal treatment, transparency and non-
discrimination must be considered when a ground of exclusion arises. In this 
particular case, the CJEU noted that there is no uniformed application to the 
discretionary grounds of exclusions as found in art.45 (2) of Directive 2004/18/EC 
across the 28 member states. As mentioned previously in the context of La 
Cascina50, each member state has the authority to include or not include any of 
the discretionary grounds into the national law.  As long as a member state does 
not deviate from the spirit of the directive, then it may “incorporate discretionary 
grounds with varying degree of rigour according to legal, economic or social 
considerations prevailing at national level”.51  Under the BAO explanatory notes, 
the contracting authorities are required to assess proportionality on a case by case 
basis when a discretionary ground for exclusion arises. For that reason, generally, 
a contracting authority may invoke the principle of proportionality when excluding 
suppliers guilty of grave professional misconduct.  
 
Second question  
The CJEU faced slight difficulty in assessing the second question. As suggested by 
Smith, the court was “concerned” with the balancing of the principle of equal 
treatment and transparency, that is, the direct exclusion of the Tender group due 
to the inclusion of para.3.1 into the descriptive document.52  The court took the 
approach that some suppliers who may have been interested in the contract did 
not submit a tender due to the clear, precise and unconditional inclusion of para 
3.1 which automatically excludes a supplier guilty of grave professional 
misconduct.  In other words, if it was clear in the descriptive documents that the 
contracting authority would use their discretionary power to assess the grave 
professional misconduct, other suppliers would have taken part in the tender 
process. The CJEU was of the opinion that this would have applied to suppliers 
from other member states as they would not be familiar with the BAO and its 
explanatory notes. As was rightly suggested by Smith, the ruling from the CJEU 
was a balance between the principle of equal treatment, transparency and 
proportionality with the principle of equal treatment and transparency prevailing.  
Perhaps a different decision would have been reached if the CJEU was of the 
opinion that the procurement principles are implied into the descriptive documents 
or the national law irrespective of the lack of expressed inclusion. It is an important 
principle of law that any contractual terms and conditions or obligations are 
subject to the law governing the contract. For example, the sale of goods in the 
United Kingdom is governed by the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (‘SGA’). In every 
contract where goods are being sold, it is an implied term under the SGA that the 
goods are sold according to the description provided by the seller. Therefore, even 
if the contract is silent on this matter, the implied term will prevail.  
 
                                                          
50  La Cascina (n 41) 
51 Connexxion (n 44) 
52 Smith (n 49) 
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It should be no different in the realm of public procurement. As mentioned earlier, 
this procurement was governed by Directive 2004/18/EC due to the value of the 
contract exceeding the EU threshold.  This meant that any obligations created by 
the contracting authority are subject to the provisions in the directive, the relevant 
provision here being the art 2 – principles of awarding contracts. Therefore, 
despite the descriptive document not explicitly stating the assessment of the 
procurement principles, the assessment of the principle of proportionality is 
implied and this is in compliance with the EU and the Dutch procurement rules as 
set out in the Directive and in the BAO’s explanatory note.  
The case of Casertana Costruzioni Srl and Assitur v Camera di Commercio53 also 
addressed the principle of proportionality in relation to the selection criteria which 
determine the economic and financial standing of the supplier and the technical 
and/or professional ability to perform the contract.  Despite the subject matter of 
this case being different to that of Connexxion, the same rule applies and that is 
the assessment of the procurement principles in all stages of the tender process.  
There are many valuable lessons to be learnt from these cases. From a contracting 
authority’s point of view, whilst the above cases predominantly dealt with the 
principle of proportionality, it is envisaged that the principles of equal treatment, 
transparency and non-discrimination apply in the same manner. Therefore, it is 
important for contracting authorities to consider these principles before excluding 
suppliers on the grounds of grave professional misconduct.  Whilst assessing one 
principle i.e. the principle of proportionality, contracting authorities should ensure 
that the other principles are not neglected as was stated in Connexxion54. Failure 
to do so may result in a challenge to the procurement rules which will create an 
automatic suspension of the award of the contract. Failure to address this issue at 
this stage may lead to the issuing of proceedings.  
In like manner, the above cases give hope to suppliers who have been found guilty 
of grave professional misconduct. It essentially creates another lifeline which 
allows suppliers to be considered for the contract without the use of the self-




Due to the importance of public procurement to the member states, the regulation 
of public procurement is crucial in ensuring public funds are spent in a way that 
shows accountability and transparency in government. In the EU, public 
procurement is subject to the Directive 2014/24/EU. As part of the process of 
eliminating suppliers, contracting authorities may exclude suppliers on the 
grounds of grave professional misconduct. Even though this ground is 
incorporated into the directives, the EU legislature failed to define this concept. As 
a result, the court has been instrumental in the interpretation and development 
of this concept.  
 
                                                          
53   Case  C-538/07, Assitur  v  Camera  di  Commercio,  Industria,  Artigianato  e  
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The paper has attempted to establish how the role of the court is important in the 
creation of law both in the EU and in domestic courts. Through the analysis of case 
law, the author has been able to identify lessons for contracting authorities and 
suppliers as a result of the preliminary references sent by national courts. The first 
lesson instructs contracting authorities to carry out satisfactory due diligence 
before excluding a supplier on the grounds of grave professional misconduct. The 
second informs the contracting authority that they cannot use additional grounds 
other than those listed in the directive to exclude suppliers. Finally, the third lesson 
reminds contracting authorities of their obligation to comply with the procurement 
principles when excluding suppliers on the grounds of grave professional 
misconduct.   While it is acknowledged that following these simple steps will not 
avoid litigation or challenges to the procurement process, it will limit the 
probability of a supplier being awarded a remedy as a result of an exclusion on 
the grounds of grave professional misconduct.   
 
Learning from past mistakes is key to success. This well-known proverb is 
applicable to procurement as the author has sought to identify in this paper. These 
lessons are vital in ensuring that contracting authorities do not fall into bad 
practice, challenges and proceedings brought against them. Although this issue 
was not emphasised in this paper, the consequences to the contracting authority 
as a result of a challenge leads to the automatic suspension of the contract, the 
setting aside of the contract or other remedies imposed by the courts.  
 
